

Project Summary

"Whose Intuitions? Which Dualism?"

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Proponents of cognitive science of religion have claimed that dualism and belief in non-material agents are either "intuitive" (Bloom, Guthrie) or "counter-intuitive" (Boyer, Barrett). However, these claims require greater philosophical scrutiny as to just what is meant by "dualism", "belief" and "(counter-)intuitive". I propose to examine these claims to clarify (a) just what sorts of concepts and beliefs really seem to be evidenced (e.g., constituting something as an agent without also constituting it as something with a body vs. an agent *without* a body), and (b) whether they are really *competing* claims or perhaps snapshots of different developmental stages.

This project will include attendance and participation in conferences, and the preparation of articles for scholarly and general audiences.